Introduction
There is no doubt that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have come to be the main tools to maintain peace around the world. From a military perspective, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the main player in assisting Member States and the Secretary-General in maintaining international peace and security. DPKO maintains close relations with the Security Council, UN missions, and financial contributors. DPKO's task is to plan, prepare, and manage peacekeeping operations in order to fulfill the UN mandate. Every UN mission is provided a mandate by the Security Council, which underlines the task that the tactical commander must perform to successfully accomplish the assigned mission. 1 This monograph will explore how the UN in general and DPKO in particular are structured to conduct operational planning. To address this issue the monograph will look in depth at the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda from 1993 to the genocide in 1994. Taking the genocide in Rwanda as a case study, the study asks whether an operational planning cell could have provided better tactical and strategic level guidance to the UN decisions makers. In 1941, during the Second World War, the American President and British Prime Minister discussed how to maintain and re-establish peace after the war. The outcome was the Atlantic Charter. The Atlantic Charter was "a common programme for the allied states and pledged mutual support in the war efforts and rejected any separate peace or armistice." 2 After much discussion between the British Prime Minister and the President, the term "United Nations" came to life on 24 October 1945. The intent of the United Nations (UN) was to prevent another world war. Considering that the UN had no legal application it made progress through inspirational example: "WE, THE 1 The United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www. un.org/en/ peacekeeping/about/dpko (accessed 3 January 2012). PEOPLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime had brought untold sorrow to making." 3 With time, the main purpose of the UN came to be international peace and security, to establish friendly relations with other nations and promote human rights. The United Nations was to replace the League of Nations to facilitate cooperation with international laws, security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and most of all, world peace. Eventually peacekeeping, peace-building, conflict prevention, and human efforts became the promotional image under which the UN forged its reputation.
The UN started with a mission in 1948 in the Middle East with unarmed observers, which quickly evolved to an armed peacekeeping operation in 1956 to address the conflict on the Suez
Canal. Since then the world has witnessed thousands of blue helmets deployed around the world in order to maintain peace and security. In 1988, the Noble Peace Price was awarded to UN members. 4 Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the successes of the UN came from its functional organization and exceptional leadership. Six sub-organizations form the heart of the UN. They include the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. Assuredly, the UN demonstrated success as a professional and functional organization but also by following a code of conduct, the UN Charter. The UN charter forms the core values under which peace, justice, human rights, and collective security are embedded and are the values that the UN promotes in the world. The core members form the nucleus of the UN and they 3 Ibid., 20.
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The United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www. un.org/ en/peacekeeping/about/dpko (accessed 3 January 2012).
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The United Nations, UN at a Glance, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (accessed 3 January 2012). exercise political power through their common values and interest. The decision making process within the UN is influenced greatly by the divergence in policies and political agreement displayed by member states. Therefore the UN is a political organization more than anything else. 6 After much success the UN embarked in 1990 on a difficult decade with disappointing results that would force the UN to question its purpose. Those disappointing results were clearly observed in Bosnia, Somalia, and most of all, the genocide in Rwanda where between 800,000 to 1 million human beings, including women and children, lost their life under the supervision of
UN military forces.
The document will analyze three crucial problems to validate the thesis. First, it examines how the UN was structured to do or not do effective operational planning at the time of the Rwanda mission. Second, the paper examines the related issues of the UN operating mandate and rules of engagement (ROE) which the tactical commander must follow to accomplish his mission. Lastly, it explores why the UN deliberately ignored the situation in Rwanda until it had deteriorated to a point where DPKO action was unable to make a difference to the outcome of the genocide.
This document contains five sections. The first section gives a brief history of Rwanda and introduces the topic of operational planning cells. The next section looks at Rwanda, the start of the genocide and how the UN initially sent forces into Rwanda. The third section will outline the three problems faced by the UN mission in Rwanda. The fourth section will analyze the problems specific to Rwanda and those more generally related to the structure of the DPKO.
Finally, the last part will offer analysis and recommendations concerning future UN operations planning. 6 Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Colorado, Westview Press, 1994) , 4-28.
Tutsi: a Superior Race
To understand the situation and the environment the author must synthesize Rwanda's history. The 1994 genocide is the outcome of the continuous historical fighting between the Tutsi and Hutu. In the case of the Genocide in Rwanda, history provides an understanding of how a country evolved from within. The continuous history of violence between the Tutsi and the Hutu is crucial to the planning as the Arusha Accords try to unify the two tribes that are in constant disagreement. The UN should have anticipated from a historical point of view that the Arusha Accord was in fact another reason for both tribes to turn to violence against each another.
European nations governed and ruled Rwanda from its beginning up to the 20th century.
It started with the council of Berlin identifying Rwanda-Burundi as part of a German sphere of interest in 1885. The Germans came to Rwanda during a crucial time when political reform was taking place after the death of King Kigeli IV. The Germans instituted a colonial policy of indirect rule using the existing government structure to facilitate the process. The impact was significant because it provided for a very flexible monarchy, which was twofold; first to increase Tutsi power and second to control the Tutsi as they used the German forces to reinforce their own power. Over time, the Germans realized the limited possibility for economic expansion with cattle compared with the surrounding region that exploited the commerce of diamonds, gold, and copper. The Hutu quickly realized the relation between money and power. Money provided a better lifestyle for the Tutsi versus raising cattle. This new money economy reduced Tutsi influence. The Rwanda coffee crop changed the economy significantly. Another factor that jeopardized Tutsi's power was the new head tax, which the Hutu perceived as the German becoming their protectors. 7 The Germans started to educate the Tutsi. This allowed the Tutsi to work under the Germans in various capacities within the administration. The Germans also educated a few Hutu, which played a major role in their efforts to obtain political rights and equality. Educated Hutu possessed the ability to access positions of influence previously entire Tutsi chiefly hierarchy.
9 Belgium intended to manage the country through the Tutsi's administration in a manner similar to their predecessor. However, contrary to Germany, the Belgians only allowed the Tutsi to attend school. This made a distinction between both tribes and again elevated the Tutsi as the superior race. Creating two distinct groups of people generated hostility between the two. 10 During this period, Belgium concentrated their efforts in promoting social and economic progress: Again, Westerners create a significant hierarchy that would only aggravate the situation in the long term.
The greatest mistake this government could make would be to suppress the Mututsi caste.
Such a revolution would lead the country directly to anarchy and to hateful anti-European communism. "We will have no better, more active and more intelligent chiefs than the Batutsi.
They are the ones best suited to understand progress and the one the population like best. The government must work with mainly with them."
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Belgium developed the Rwandans' population to be individualist, by introducing taxation, which became a responsibility for all citizens; they transformed their economy based on family to an individually-based economy. It resulted in each individual acting and thinking for himself.
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The United Nations (UN) was the result of the Second World War. 
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The inevitable happened; in February 1959, physical attacks began between the Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsi paid a big price; the current Rwandan administration arrested many leaders of UNAR party, while many others fled Rwanda to Tanganyika or Uganda with the intent to escape prosecution. Approximately 5,000 Tutsi saw their huts burned and this action resulted in more than 7,000 refugees. In April 1960, more than 22,000 refugees fled to a refugee camps provided 15 Prunier, 45. 16 Prunier, [46] [47] [48] through the Government refugee centers in the country. Many others left the country in the direction of Burundi, Uganda, and the Congo. representing the culture well. As a result, a new flag was approved and the proclamation of the new Republic was announced.
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In an attempt to prevent disorder in Rwanda, the Belgians decided to grant de facto recognition to the Republican regime. The UN and Trusteeship Commission did not support the decision. To prevent further unilateral decision from the Belgium administration, the General Assembly passed a resolution where the Belgium's administration had "exclusive responsibility"
of Rwanda-Burundi. The intent of this resolution was to make Belgium accountable to the UN for the execution of the Trusteeship Agreement. The overall outcome of the resolution forced the Belgians to withdraw the de facto recognition of the Republican regime.
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On September 1961, elections took place that resulted in the beginning of a new era of Kayibanda. Out of a possible forty-four seats, the PARMEHUTU won the majority of seats with thirty-five. UNAR won seventeen percent of the seats and therefore lost control even though colonial powers described them as the supposable superior race. 21 Instead of having equilibrium within the government, the election resulted in just another monopolist government. Thereafter, for many years, the country came to enjoy stability in the absence of violence and cultural dispute, and saw a growing economy with growth of a coffee based economy.
Unfortunately, the country's stability eventually suffered with the emerging growth in population 23 Kuperman, 95. 24 Prunier, 75. 25 Kuperman, 95: Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006) 23. Kayibanda came from Gitarama Prefecture in the southcenter region of the country. His rule largely benefited Hutus from his home region. Habyarimana, by contrast, came from Gisenyi Prefecture, and his rule largely benefited northerners, in particular those from the northwest. 26 Freeman, 19: The President was unabashed about his decision: "I know some people favour multipartyism, but as far as I am concerned, I have had no hesitation in choosing the single party system." In 1978, article 7 of the Constitution enshrined single-party rule as a basic value of the regime. Prunier, and the collapse in the world coffee price in 1989. The RPF saw this instability as an opportunity to invade and take government by force. The invasion was short. Their commander died which generated confusion within the invading force. Opposing forces implemented a ceasefire in March 1991.
27 Throughout 1991, the international community applied pressure to Rwanda. properly describes in his book the impact of this reform: "The MDR had gone from an oligarchic party in control of the state to a minority party that wouldn't be able to win a vote." The last key factor of the Arusha Accords was a ceasefire monitored by an international peacekeeping force during the time of transition. 28 The UN was unaware of the vital role they would play during this transitional period.
Furthermore, after the invasion of the rebels of 1990, Rwanda saw not only a change political orientation but also a growth in the Rwandan armed forces. After the unsuccessful 27 Freeman, 21.
28 Straus, [24] [25] Freeman, 22. invasion of the rebels, the President of Rwanda saw an opportunity to strengthen his military.
With the support of France, who provided weapons and training instructors, the Rwandan armed forces grew from 5,200 men in October 1990 to 50,000 in 1992. 29 The majority of the enlisted were landless peasants, the urban unemployed with little to no education. 30 This was one of the major signs that the inevitable was being prepared or the Hutu would not return under a Tutsi Genocide. 31 In Rwanda, there is a constant struggle for power. The general assumption in this type of democracy is that tribes will not share power. Another assumption is that the Hutu will remain reluctant to lose political power considering that they lived under Tutsi control from the 14th century until 1957.
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The intent of the Arusha Accords was to create a government that would include ministers from both tribes and that would generate options on the best possible way to reintegrate General Dallaire, back from his reconnaissance, acknowledged the risk associated with this mission but was optimistic. To mitigate the risk in a country with a serious history of violence, he determined an optimal mission size required the deployment of 8,000 troops. 38 Unfortunately, the Security Council faced an urgent dilemma in Somalia. Two days before the DPKO introduced the Rwanda resolution for approval in the Security Council, eighteen American soldiers and five hundred Somalis lost their life in a similar UN mission in Somalia. With a prior similar situation in Bosnia, the US was therefore reluctant to take part in another peacekeeping operation.
September 1993, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, proposed a plan to the Security Council that included a total peacekeeping force of 2,548 soldiers, which was not in line with Gen. Dallaire recommendations. Overall the mission supported the establishment of a multiparty democratic government and monitored the integration of the RDF troops into the Army. 39 In this regard the Security Council approved the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) but with restrictions. These restrictions limited the UN force to operate in Kigali, the Rwandan capital. The big dilemma was over the size of the force. Most Western leaders envisioned a force of less than 3,000 troops while the US envisioned only a force of 100 troops.
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On 5 October 1993, the Security Council approved the mission under United Nations resolution 872. The purpose of the mission focused on the implementation of the Arusha Accords.
The mission would operate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter titled Pacific Settlement of 38 "I was feeling very confident about our plan for the reconnaissance or, in UN-speak, the "technical mission." Maurice listened to me carefully but told me not to come back to him with a request for a brigade-sized mission. His words were roughly, 'this thing has to be small and inexpensive, otherwise it will never get approved by the Security Council.' I was taken aback." Roméo Dallaire, 56; Jones, 105. Dispute. 41 The specifics of the UN Charter became important in the later analysis of the mission.
It was a classic peacekeeping operation focused on the consent of both parties involved in the agreement. The UNAMIR's mandate included the following tasks:
"To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, inter alia, within a weapon-secure area established by the parties in and around the city;
To monitor the observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zones and other demilitarization procedures;
To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate, leading up to the election;
To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;
To investigate, at the request of the parties, or on its own initiative, instances of alleged noncompliance with the provisions of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and or pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriated to the Secretary-General;
To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwanda refugees and settlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;
To assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations; and
To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police."
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The mandate, as detailed as it was, did not include the fundamental purpose as outlined in the Arusha Accords which ensured overall security in Rwanda, ensured security for civilians, prevented arms flow, and neutralized armed groups. 43 This omission contributed largely to the mission failure. These omissions from the mandate's main tasks had a devastating impact on the options available to Gen. Dallaire. In light of the approved mandate for Rwanda, the author finds 41 Baehr and Gordenker, 171.
42 Jones, 107. 43 Ibid.,106.
it difficult to believe the mandate was in line with the original purpose of the United Nations.
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How can a tactical commander maintain peace and security if he does not possess the tools to accomplish his mission? The purpose of the UN is, in general terms, to maintain peace and human rights, but the ROE's and mandate did not go hand in hand to provide this peaceful environment. Further discussion on this matter will follow below.
The first sign of the possibility of a tragedy came from a fax from Gen. Dallaire. In this communication addressed to Kofi Annan, who was running the UN peacekeeping operation in New York, he explained there was a significant possibility of a conspiracy by Rwanda's leader to conduct a mass killing in the near future. Gen. Dallaire based his assessment of an anonymous informant named "Jean Pierre" who was high in the Interahamwe Rwandan Militia organization.
The information provided by "Jean Pierre" alarmed Gen. Dallaire as "Jean Pierre" explained that the current government was finalizing a plan to eliminate Rwanda's Tutsi. 45 The plan included the importation of weapons including AK-47 assault rifles, grenades, and large quantities of machetes--many more than could be classified as for "agricultural use." The informant's information provided Gen. Dallaire with the possible rate of killing, described as 1,000 Tutsi in 20 minutes. 46 Gen. Dallaire's report highlighted that the planning described by "Jean-Pierre" took 44 "To maintain international peace and security, and to end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or others breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful methods, and in conformity with the principals of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situation which might lead to a breach of the peace;
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principal of equal rights and self-determination of people, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamentals freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." Peter R. Baehr, and Leon Gordenker. 164. into consideration the political environment and the need to prevent the involvement of the UNAMIR forces. As a result, they intended to murder Belgian peacekeepers. The plan was well thought out and they understood the political ramification the Belgian government would withdraw their forces from Rwanda.
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This consideration is important as the UNAMIR forces relied upon the Belgian contingent as the most professional and experienced soldiers under Gen. Dallaire's command.
The Belgian contingent of 420 soldiers was located in Kigali, reinforced by 400 Ghanaian soldiers, and supported by 600 logisticians, engineers, medical and headquarters personnel.
Another Ghanaian battalion monitored the RPA in Byumba. A Bangladeshi battalion monitored the FAR in Ruhengeri, together generating a force of 1,000 peacekeepers.
48 At this point, the force ratio is essential to understanding the problem faced by the UN. The Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) under the Hutu had a force between 55,000 to 70,000, which included the Presidential Army the guard, and National Police. The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) under the Tutsi had a force between 20,000 to 25,000. On the other hand, the UNAMIR peacekeepers were only 2,500 of which only 420 from the Belgian contingent could be considered professional soldiers.
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Annan took a close look at the cable sent by his force commander in Rwanda. Annan ordered Gen. Dallaire to maintain his neutral status under the Chapter IV of the UN Charter.
Annan also told Gen. Dallaire to advise the president about the plot. The problem was that the president was most likely involved in the planning of the mass killing of the Tutsi tribe. 50 Gen. 47 He also gave us the road map to the structure and planning process of the extremists. By midJanuary, thanks to Jean-Pierre, we had all the information we needed to confirm that there was a wellorganized conspiracy inside the country, dedicated to destroyed the Arusha Peace Agreement by any means necessary. Dallaire, ix-169. ; Lebor, 167. 48 Kuperman, 40. 49 Ibid. 50 To notify the Rwanda president (who was himself thought to be implicated in the plot)… Dallaire, x.
Dallaire disagreed with Annan and contested his decision and directives, but the UN political leader remained firm and did not change his mind. Annan, on his own initiative decided not to inform the major powers of the Security Council and "buried the genocide fax." 51 Even BoutrosGhali's representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, tried to convince Kofi Annan how UNAMIR trusted the informant and warned Annan that they had a maximum of forty-eight hours before the Hutu distributed the weapons and therefore, UN forces would be unable to retrieve them. The Hutu used a selective process to kill their first victims. They attacked the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, in her house. The Belgian contingent provided her close protection. The Belgians were young soldiers with no experience and without a leader among 51 Lebor, 168; But there was no will and no way. General Dallaire's cable, now known as the "genocide fax" -a clear, unambiguous warning of a planned, even announced, mass slaughter -was sidelined by the DPKO; Dallaire, x. 52 The next day, his boss, Boutros-Ghali's special representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, a former foreign minister of Cameron, replied to Annan. Lebor, 168-169. 53 Dallaire, x. 54 "The Interahamwe are trained military killers, It has been said in many quarters that the MR.ND government is training Interahamwe in commando tactics such as the use of knives, machetes, rope trapping and binding of victims and silent guns so as to kill people. " Freeman, [24] [25] them. They followed the mandate and complied with the orders of the Rwandan forces. They gave up their weapons, which was a regrettable action on their part because they were immediately transferred to a military camp and killed. Others on the list of "VIP Killing," included the President of the Constitutional Court, Charles Shamukiga, and a civil rights activist, Landwald Ndqsingwa, just to name a few who suffered the same fate as the ten Belgian soldiers.
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From that day on, thousands and thousands of Tutsi and Hutu, supporters of president Habyarimana, were massacred in the genocide. No one was spared as women and children fell under the same horrifying tragedy as male adults. On the 29 April, the United Nations calculated the massacre at that more than 200,000 people. This is 8,695 deaths per day, a rate of 362 deaths per hour. Sadly enough, it took so many deaths to gain the attention of the UN Security Council and thus reopening the Rwanda dilemma.
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After the loss of the ten Belgian soldiers, everything went according to the genocide plan.
As predicted, the Belgians withdrew their forces from Rwanda and eventually the UN decided to draw down its commitment to a symbolic force with the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 912. By the end of April, only 470 troops remained in Kigali. 57 On the 17 May 1994, the Security Council approved a new mandate under Resolution 918. This new resolution created UNAMIR 2, which authorized 5,500 troops deployed over a period of thirty-one days. This new mandate gave flexibility to Gen. Dallaire to apply force where required. The mandate enabled UNAMIR to protect refugees and civilians at risk, establish and 55 Prunier, 230. 56 Jones, 122. 57 Ibid., [122] [123] maintain a secure humanitarian zone, and provide security to relief missions. By the time the approved third mandate was in effect on the ground, the total cost was 500,000 deaths.
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Missing the Link from Strategy to Tactics
At the end of this tragedy the death toll reached 800,000 to 1,000,000 people. How could the United Nation let a tragedy go on for more than three months, considering that some of the most powerful countries in the world, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China served as core components of the UN? 59 In the case of Rwanda, many books and articles shed light on the genocide with the intent of providing answers to the tragedy that almost resulted in the annihilation of the entire Tutsi tribe. This portion of the document will also offer an answer to the question.
The first problem is the inefficient organizational structure of the UN, a problem that contributed to the failure of the mission. The inability of the UN to link the strategic intent to tactical actions demonstrates the absence of an operational planning capacity, ultimately resulting in UN leaders moving forward with an inaccurate set of assumptions. The structure of the UN provides the organization with the ability and capacity to operate in a bureaucratic and political forum. This structure reveals itself ineffective in an operational sense. DPKO did not have the capability to plan at the operational level. The incapacity of the UN to command and control its operations resulted in the tragic outcome in Rwanda. From the perspective of command and control, it is a matter of providing accurate and timely information on decisions and guidance to the force commander. In this case, Gen. Dallaire "is still looking for the operational and moral 58 Dallaire, 375 . 
DPKO and Operational Art
Peace operations often emerge as more complicated than conventional war fighting operations because peacekeeping troops must serve as a neutral third party attempting to satisfy both entities involved in the conflict. Therefore, minor tactical actions and decisions by this and considers risk across the levels of war. Operational art is not a recipe that if followed will always, without a doubt, provide successful outcomes. Commanders must not forget that the enemy has a vote. However, if performed with creative imagination incorporated with knowledge, skill, and experience, operational art provides better results than without. In other words, "Operational art is pivotal to success in war, as it is the essential link between the goals of strategy and the capabilities of tactics."
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The first problem with the organizational structure of the UN is arguably the lack of an operational planning cell. This structural problem rests on one's interpretation of the situation. In this case, Annan's interpretation jeopardized the mission by providing an inaccurate representation of the situation. The UN Secretariat failed to provide the Security Council a current analysis or projected outcome of the situation in Rwanda. 63 An operational planning cell would have generated options in terms of risk analysis, but there was no such analysis. Gen.
Dallaire based his optimism on his expectation that a contingent of 8,000 troops could achieve optimum success. This clearly indicates the lack of an operational planning cell for all missions at the time of the genocide.
The conventional chain of command for a tactical commander is to report to an operational level authority. In Gen. Dallaire's context, the command relationship was inadequate to provide sufficient guidance to make the mission a success. In the context of a UN mission, the force commander is subordinate to a political chief of mission. The chief of mission then reports DPKO is responsible for planning, support and direct peacekeeping operations. DPKO is also responsible to assist Member States and the Secretary-General in promoting peace and security. Taking into consideration the responsibility of DPKO to plan UN missions and the tragic result of the mission in Rwanda, the assumption is that the organizational construct of DPKO not only lacks an operational planning cell, but also lacks the methodology to link the strategy to tactical actions. As the CALL study showed, there was simply no operational planning structure inside DPKO. In effect, operational planning occurred in the Secretary-General's office far removed from events on the ground. The Secretary General endorsed in 2006 the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principal and Guidelines, which introduced the methodology that DPKO is now using for mission planning which is called the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). The intent of the IMPP is "designed to facilitate achievement of his common understanding by establishing a planning process that engages the capabilities of all parts of the UN system relevant to achieve impact in a given country setting. Most importantly, "DPKO will be designated as the lead for the operational planning." 68 This new process is intended to unify tactical level actions with the strategic intent. IMPP will eliminate individual decision-making process and provide efficient and effective methodology for future missions. The IMPP "aims to assist UN actors to achieve a common strategic and operational plan that is responsible to the objectives of the UN system and the Security Council mandate through a shared understanding of the priorities. 69 Unfortunately, this change came too late for the genocide in Rwanda.
The Undersecretary General is in charge of DPKO. The Undersecretary reports directly to the Secretary General. Most importantly, the Military Staff Committee's (MSC) responsibilities are to advise, assist, employed, and command operational forces. Article 47 from
Chapter VII of the UN Charter outlines the composition and responsibilities of the MSC.
DPKO is responsible for the planning and controlling UN operations. Considering the lack of an operational planning cell to conduct adequate planning, the UN therefore did not possess the ability to provide subordinate commander with proper guidance. Furthermore, the capacity to analyze information provided by the troops on the groundwas inefficient. Therefore, the operational planning cell serves a crucial function at both the strategic level and tactical level.
In a 1993 report, Mr. Annan explained the UN structure for command and control as having four levels: Grand Strategic Level, Strategic Level, Operational Level, and a Tactical Level.
Grand Strategic Level: The applications of multinational resources to achieve policy objectives (mandate). (This is the preserve of the Security Council with the support of the Governments of Member States).
Strategic Level: The application of military, political and other supporting resources to achieve those objectives specified by Grand Strategy. (It will be determined by the Secretary-General and his senior advisors on peace-keeping operations in consultation with contributing Member States).
Operational Level: The direction of military, political and other supporting resources to achieve the objectives of strategy. (It will be conducted by an in-theater Head of Mission or Force Commander but will be heavily subject to influence or direction from the Grand and/or Strategic level authorities).
Tactical Level: the disposition of units and supporting agencies for particular tasks which will themselves support operational objectives. (Commanders subordinate to the operational level will conduct it).
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Mr. Annan expressed that one of the structural problems of the UN was the confusion at the strategic level created by two levels of strategy. Having a strategy formulated at two distinct levels, the Secretariat and the Security Council, is unnecessarily confusing and inefficient. Two organizations providing guidance can only result in conflicting ideas. Consequently, in the case of the mission in Rwanda, the outcome was devastating. Again, the intent of an operational planning cell is to navigate through those confusing problems at the strategic level and to generate operational options to leaders. The UN Security Council conducted an independent inquiry into the actions or inaction of the UN prior to and during the genocide. The inquiry concluded that the mission was not "planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed" in a way to provide the tools and proper mandate for the tactical commander to make the mission a success.
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Joint Publication 3.0 (JP 3.0), Joint Operations, defines strategy as a "prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives." Therefore, a strategy must outline clearly the objective to achieve in order to get to the desired end-state. The strategic context under which the Rwanda mission emerged states "some people in DPKO thought that a small and quick success story in Rwanda might inspire member nations to place increase confidence in the UN's efforts and be more generous with military and financial resources. Let us turn our attention to the mandate identified as the second problem affecting the success of this mission. The intent is to develop a deep understanding of the mandate and link its conceptual nature to concrete actions performed by the tactical commander in order to meet the strategic end-state. This is the main task of an operational cell.
The mandate included eight paragraphs, which provided to Gen. The first paragraph established the task, "to contribute to the security." In military lexicon, one must ask the meaning of the term "contribute." The task, "contribute" does not appear in any doctrinal materials, and the dictionary provides the only option in trying to grasp the meaning of the task performed by the tactical commander. The definition of the word "contribute" means, to "help, to cause, or bring about." Obviously, this definition assists a tactical commander in a limited manner.
In the second and third paragraph, the mandate directs the tactical commander, "to monitor the observance of the cease-fire agreement…and to monitor the security situation."
Again, the UN presented the commander with the same problem, where the task "to monitor"
does not appear in any doctrinal documents. The dictionary again provides an understanding of the meaning as it defines, "monitor" as to "observe and check the progress or quality of Paragraphs seven and eight request the tactical commander to "assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities and to investigate and report on incidents." Again, this brings the question, why does this mission require the use of a military force? One can assume that if the mission required soldiers, the possibility exists that the situation may take a negative turn and those forces might require the use of force. In this case, the ROEs only authorized forces 73 Dallaire, x. to use force in self-defense. Prudence would require that the commander on the ground be given autonomy to adopt a more strong and assertive approach. The failures by the UN did not go unnoticed. On 23 August 2000, the UN released a report, known as the Brahimi Report, which outlined more than fifty-six recommendations to solve the problems that the UN endured during the early 1990s operations. Most notable is recommendation three of the Brahimi Report which indicated the weakness in the ROEs and therefore inefficient accomplishment of the mandate:
"United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates…with robust rules of engagement against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence."
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The most intriguing paragraph of the mandate was paragraph six, which directed the commander to "monitor the process of repatriation of Rwanda refugees and settlement of the displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner." 75 The intent was not to question the significance of the word "monitor," but in this case, the concept of a "safe and orderly manner" became the issue. From the perspective of providing safety and order to any situation, there remains an underlying assumption that disorder and chaos exist in the current environment. In making this assumption, the proper operational approach must develop the required means for the tactical commander to execute this task. Unfortunately, Gen. Jones, 106. the mandate which will morally and legally required UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them)." 76 The DPKO proposed that the mission in Rwanda fall under Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Dispute of the UN Charter. Chapter VI clearly states, "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." There was a clear misunderstanding of paragraph six of the mandate, which is to assist the coordination of humanitarian assistance with relief operation in a safe and secure environment, and the principal foundation of Chapter VI from the UN Charter, "pacific settlement of dispute." How can the tactical commander provide a secure and safe environment when not authorized the use of force?
To make things worse for the tactical commander, the ROE followed the pacific intent of Chapter VI, which authorized the tactical commander to use lethal force only for self-defense.
The commander must maintain a safe environment; it is the responsibility of the UN to provide the means to accomplish this task. The intention of ROEs is to balance the force ratio between superior and inferior forces. In this case, considering the ratio of forces, where 2,500 peacekeepers, of which only the 420 Belgians are considered professional military soldiers, against 55,000 to 70,000 armed Hutu, the ROEs did not allow Gen. Dallaire to generate options on how to solve an armed conflict.
Considering the large difference in quantity of soldiers between peacekeepers and the local armed forces, the peacekeepers absolutely needed authorization for the use of force to gain 76 United Nations Security Council document S/1999 S/ /1257 S/ , 16 December 1999 leverage. In addition, the tactical force commander should have possessed the initial capabilities to deter both Hutu and Tutsi considering their past conflict history.
The last dilemma the UN faced in Rwanda was to develop a reasonable situational understanding of the operational environment. Before the UN engaged with troops and resources, they had to determine the political will of the international community and definitely the positions of the Permanent Five countries on the Security Council. This before everything was the first condition for mission success.
From a political point of view, the US promoted UN peacekeeping operations as a way to build, reform, promote democracy, and therefore end the post-Cold War era. Unfortunately, the mission in Rwanda came at a time when the US lost many soldiers in Somalia. 77 The US, still coping with the situation in Somalia, was not prepared to commit troops in another African 
Operational Art
It is the author's intent to demonstrate that with operational art, UN leaders would have had a better understanding of the situation and therefore a means to develop an appropriate operational approach. Operational art enables leadership to envision how the mission will unfold by establishing the conditions that will allow it to reach a successful end-state. 79 The intent of operational art is to determine the most effective, efficient ways to accomplish the mission. Using the elements of operational art, it provides a methodology to link tactical actions to strategy.
As demonstrated in the analysis, the DPKO mission in Rwanda was likely to fail. Using the elements of operational art, the problem would have appeared in the analysis of the situation.
The intended use of operational art is as an analytical framework to link ends, ways, and means to achieve mission success. In this context, peacekeeping operations were dangerously close to the concept of open conflict. However, a tactical defeat in a peacekeeping operation may result in the defeat of the overall strategic efforts.
The eleven elements of operational art provide a way to dissect a problem, outline the possible solution, and consequently frame mitigating elements.
The risks associated with this mission were significant. The UN promoted the mission in Rwanda as a publicity stunt to reestablish the reputation that was compromised severely with the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. Consequently, the UN needed the mission to succeed, but ultimately lacked the forces to achieve the desired end-state. A planner using the elements of operational art have arrived at the following analysis:
End The mandate outlines these end-state and conditions but the missing parts are the ways and the means needed to accomplish the mission. This is where an operational planning cell comes into play.
Risks (R):
The purpose is to outline where risks existed within the mission, would have allowed a planner to identify mitigating factors (MF) and provide options to the decision-makers.
This list of risks comes out of a planning staff detailed planning efforts:
81 U.S. Army and Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual 3-0, 7-6. Culmination (C): From FM 3-0, culmination "is that point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capacity to continue its current form of operation." 83 In this particular case, the intent is for planners to imagine how a mission could ultimately fail.
C: The international community's unwillingness to participate in the mission. MF: A robust mandate that provides flexibility and strength by the forces in place. MF: Initially incorporate other elements of national power in the conflict to demonstrate the ability and flexibility to adapt to any changes to the environment.
C: Not having the resources to accomplish the mission. MF: Sources a professional military force. MF: Allocate military equipment prior to mission execution.
C: Inability to provide a safe and secure environment. MF: Provide a capable UN force in strength and capability. MF: Operate under Charter VII, which allow the use of force to accomplish the mission.
The overall purpose of operational art is to link the 11 elements in comprehensive analysis, that provides an assessment and analysis of the situation and therefore helps the commander to understand, visualize, describe, direct, and assess the situation. Consequently, leaders will be in a position to lead forces and make decisions being aware fully of the consequences of their actions.
Conclusion
The Rwandan genocide was unacceptable. The mission plan was never going to succeed considering the premise that the UN needed a success story considering the missions in Bosnia and Somalia where the UN lost credibility worldwide. Moreover, the UN sealed the fate of the mission when they turned a blind eye on the weapons cache and informant information that highlighted the possibility of genocide.
On 13 May 1994, the Security Council authorized another force for Rwanda. This force included 5,500 soldiers. The UN armed these forces and included mobility assets to deter the 83 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] ongoing hostilities. Nevertheless the question remains: What happened to the initial force requested by Gen. Dallaire after his reconnaissance and his draft ROE? Gen. Dallaire request 8,000 soldiers for an optimum result but agreed that a force of 5,000 can accomplish the mission successfully. This monograph provides an analysis of the problems faced by the UN in Rwanda before and during the genocide. The argument of the author is that an operational planning cell definitely would have overcome the problems and therefore changed the ultimate outcome in Rwanda. The structural problem, the mandate, the ROE and unfortunately a nonexistent situational understanding of the environment contributed to the loss of millions of human beings.
There is no doubt that having two levels of strategy making played a significant role in the mission's failure. The mandate and ROE's restricted Gen. Dallaire to a point of absolute chaos in Rwanda. Instead of providing the tools and resources necessary to accomplish his mission, it weakened Gen. Dallaire's ability to carry out his mandate in Rwanda. Confusion over the mandate based on a real appraisal of the situation and the definite lack of direction from DPKO in relation with the deterioration of the operating environment in Rwanda was a major contributing factor of the failure in Rwanda. The organizational planning structure proved to be ineffective. The Security Council investigation in 1999 attributed this failure to "the responsibility for the oversight in the planning of UNAMIR lies…in particular…in DPKO." The consensus process of drafting a mandate resulted in ambiguous orders more precisely confusing tasks, which the achievability of the mission is questionable. Without any guidance from DPKO other than to stay within his limited mandate, as the situation unfolded in front of Gen. Dallaire, he had no time or resources to make a difference. The lack of interest of many influential leaders played a major role in the size and mandate of the force. 85 Ibid., 32.
86 Ibid., 42.
